Composition of Exports and Cross-Country Corruption by Goel, Rajeev K. & Korhonen, Iikka
    
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 
5 • 2009 
   Rajeev K. Goel
 and Iikka Korhonen 
  
 
   Composition of exports and  




    
 
 
Bank of Finland, BOFIT 










BOFIT  Discussion Papers 
















   and Iikka Korhonen: Composition of exports and  



















This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.bof.fi/bofit  






























































 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 











1  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7 
 
2  Theoretical background .................................................................................................. 9 
 
3  Data .............................................................................................................................. 10 
 
4  Estimation ..................................................................................................................... 14 
 
5  Results .......................................................................................................................... 15 
 




References ........................................................................................................................... 25 Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 
































All opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Bank of Finland. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





1, 2   and Iikka Korhonen 
 





This research examines the connection between a country’s export structure and corrup-
tion, incorporating disaggregated data on exports for a recent time period over a large set 
of nations. We ask whether various types of exports (e.g. agricultural, mineral, manufactur-
ing and fuel) exert similar influences on corruption across nations. Our results suggest that 
corruption decreases as nations attain prosperity, as economic and political freedoms in-
crease, and with a larger government size. Ceteris paribus, transition countries are also 
found to be more corrupt. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations exert opposite influences 
on corruption, while religious fractionalization does not seem to matter. Although the ef-
fects of ore and manufacturing exports are statistically insignificant, agricultural and fuel 
exports affect corruption significantly. Our findings for fuel exports support previous re-
search, as well as uniquely demonstrate that the impact of fuel exports is sensitive to the 
prevailing corruption level. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään maan vientirakenteen ja korruption välistä yhteyttä. Tut-
kimuksessa käytetään suhteellisen disaggregoitua vientidataa viime vuosilta. Tavoitteena 
on selvittää, vaikuttavatko erilaiset vientituotteet (maantaloustuotteet, mineraalit, tehdaste-
ollisuuden tuotteet ja polttoaineet) eri tavoin korruptioon. Tulosten mukaan korruptio vä-
henee elintason kohentuessa ja taloudellisten sekä poliittisten vapauksien lisääntyessä. 
Myös laaja julkinen sektori vähentää korruptiota. Siirtymätaloudet ovat muita maita kor-
ruptoituneempia. Etnisellä ja uskonnollisella fraktionalisuudella on erilainen vaikutus kor-
ruptioon, mutta uskonnollinen fraktionalisuus ei näytä vaikuttavan korruptioon. Maatalous-
tuotteiden ja polttoaineiden vienti vaikuttaa korruptioon tilastollisesti merkitsevällä tavalla. 
Näyttää myös siltä, että polttoaineiden viennin vaikutus korruptioon riippuu vallitsevasta 
korruption tasosta, ja vaikutus on suurempi, jos korruptio on valmiiksi voimakasta. Yh-
teenvedossa tarjotaan myös politiikkasuosituksia. 
 
Asiasanat: korruptio, vienti, raaka-ainekirous, hallitus 
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1  Introduction  
 
Most of the effects of corruption on economic activity are undesirable. Despite ample evi-
dence that corruption tends to hamper economic growth (see e.g. Bulte and Damania, 
2008; Davis and Tilton, 2005; Kronenberg, 2004; Leite and Weidmann, 1999), it appears 
that in some cases corruption can actually improve economic efficiency in countries with 
rudimentary institutional set-ups (see e.g. Lui, 1985; and Meon and Weill, 2008). Study of 
corruption is important both because of its prevalence and an increasing consensus that co-
ordinated corruption control is needed at the international level to deal with countries 
struggling to stay competitive in a global economy.
1  
We are interested here in the connection between a country’s exports and corrup-
tion. There are many ways a nation’s resource exports may affect corruption. Torvik 
(2002) develops a model where increased resource endowments increase the number of entre-
preneurs engaged in rent-seeking related to those resources. The result is that entrepreneurs 
try to obtain quotas or entitlements to natural resources rather than focus on direct produc-
tion. This increased competition can motivate entrepreneurs to offer bribes or government 
officials to solicit bribes. In empirical studies, prevalence of mineral wealth is often associ-
ated with the intensity of corruption, although there is some debate surrounding this issue 
(for a literature review, see Stevens, 2003). Oil and other hydrocarbon fuels get frequent 
mention. When a country has readily accessible oil reserves, for example, a fight over 
rights can erode the quality of public institutions. More generally, intense competition to 
capture economic rents accruing from exploitation of natural resources creates ample op-
portunities for corruption.
2 The situation may be worst in countries with poor-quality insti-
tutions or a highly fractionalized society. Damania and Bulte (2008, p. 5) argue that, under 
certain conditions, resource endowments in a country permit governments to “extract 
greater surplus (bribes).” The present research is an attempt to bring empirical evidence to 
bear on these issues. 
Detailed incorporation of the role of exports at the disaggregated level, including 
agricultural, mineral, manufacturing and fuel exports, over a fairly large set of nations in a 
recent time period may be viewed as the main contribution of this work. Focus on possible 
 
1 Lambsdorff (2006) and Treisman (2000, 2007) provide summaries of studies in this field.  
2 As a rule, tax rates on personal income are low in countries with large resource endowments. This may 
make public officials less accountable towards the general public, and may lead to greater tolerance of cor-
ruption. Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





agriculture exports-corruption nexus has been especially missing.  Our underlying hy-
pothesis here is that understanding the role of various export types on corruption may help 
in the formulation of effective policies to control corruption.  
 
Figure 1  Exports by type 
  Exports by Type
% 2004 Agricultural raw 120.00
materials exports (% of 
100.00 merchandise exports) 
80.00  % 2004 Fuel exports (% of
merchandise exports) 
60.00 
% 2004 Ores and metals 40.00 
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20.00  exports) 
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Figure 1 shows the share of various raw material exports across countries as a percentage 
of total merchandise exports in 2004. Two observations stand out. First, there are wide 
variations across export types and countries. Some exports fluctuate more than others (and 
these variations change differently across nations over time). In our sample, agricultural 
exports were highest in Burkina Faso forming 72.3% of the country’s merchandise exports, 
while Algeria had the highest percentage of fuel exports at 97.4% of merchandise exports 
in 2004. Second, the quantitative differences in export shares mask qualitative differences 
across raw materials. Obviously, agricultural exports have a shorter shelf life than ores and 
metals, this distinction could crucially affect the rent-seeking opportunities associated with 
them (see Douoguih, 2005; and Gylfason, 2000). In addition, ease of extraction depends on 
the raw material involved and its location. For example, natural gas or oil extraction may 
require specific technical knowledge, but geographic and geological realities  may force 
activity into fairly small areas, making operations easy to monitor. The same may be true 
for significant ore or mineral occurences (e.g. kimberlite intrusions). On the other hand, 
activities such as timber felling in a country with vast forests may be quite decentralized 
and thus more likely to evade the attention of corrupt officials. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides some theoretical 
underpinnings for our empirical estimation. The third section presents the data, while the 
fourth section explains our estimation methodology. The fifth section discusses the results, 
and the final section concludes. 
 
 
2  Theoretical background 
  
Theoretical research on corruption has the advantage that it can borrow from the broader 
literature on the incentives for engaging in illegal activity, whereby rational law-breakers 
(bribe-takers and bribe-givers) weigh the relative costs and benefits of their actions 
(Becker, 1968). Law-breakers engage in a corrupt activity when the perceived benefits 
outweigh the expected costs. Benefits may include obtaining preferential treatment in ob-
taining government contracts, securing services one is not entitled to, or jumping the queue 
to receive services. In the case of natural resources, benefits may include entitlements or 
export quotas. The costs of engaging in the corrupt act may be a fine or prison time. Social, 
institutional and cultural factors also affect the perception of what constitutes a corrupt act. 
Thus, the government’s task in corruption control is two-fold: streamlining processes to 
lower leakages (benefits from corruption), while strengthening the apprehension and pun-
ishment of perpetrators. The more consistent the government is in its pursuit of corruption, 
the better the space of corrupt acts is defined.  
Researchers on corruption have taken these basic arguments and incorporated the 
nuances of corrupt behavior to understand incentives for engaging in corrupt activities. 
This literature borrows from the literature on industrial organizations and auctions to de-
termine the effect of discretion with government officials in awarding favors and the role 
of competition between or among bribe-takers and bribe-givers (Rose-Ackerman,1999; and 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1999). In other words, the primary focus here has been on ex-
amining the incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. 
In contrast, we here emphasize the impact of various resource endowments on 
perceived corruption. The rationale for the linkage between resource endowments and rent-
seeking behavior is that presence of resources shifts the focus of some entrepreneurs away 
from production to exploiting rents from the resources. Impatience or urgency in securing Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





these rents leads to bribe offers (for theoretical models, see Baland and Francois, 2000; and 
Torvik, 2002; for a literature review, see Stevens, 2003). 
Many studies focus on a small set of countries or use earlier data to compare the 
factors that crucially impact corruption (for literature surveys, see Treisman, 2000; Jain, 
2002; and Lambsdorff, 2006). From the set of factors affecting corruption, a few emerge as 
significant across multiple studies (Serra, 2006). In our empirical exercise, the control 
variables we apply are economic prosperity, the nature, strength, and efficacy of the gov-
ernment, as well as cultural and religious factors. It is an empirical regularity that more af-
fluent societies have less corruption. The quality of public institutions will inevitably have 
an effect on corruption. In addition, there is empirical evidence that certain religious de-
nominations can affect the level of corruption.  All these considerations are brought to bear 
in the formal analysis of the causes of corruption in section 4 below. 
  
 
3  Data 
  
In our estimations, we use data culled from various sources (a summary of our data and 
data sources appears in Table 1). Our corruption variable is based on Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a compilation of expert comments and opi-
nion surveys of perceived corruption in 180 countries. Although the time-series properties 
of the index may be susceptible to the number and frequency of surveys in any given 
country, its cross-sectional value is quite good (which is why it has been used in numerous 
studies of corruption over the past decade). The CPI value for each country also tends to 
change little from one year to the next. These properties of the CPI are the main reason for 
our choice of a cross-sectional investigation. The CPI ranges from zero to ten with higher 
values showing a lack of corruption. To facilitate interpretation of results and conform to 
our underlying regression assumptions, the index was rescaled and unbounded (our depen-
dent variable is ln[(10-CPI)/CPI], so that a higher score signifies higher corruption. We are BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
mainly interested in the effects of different resource endowments on corruption. Taking 
data from the World Bank Development Indicators, we measure the share of four product 
categories in a country’s total exports: 
•  exports of agricultural raw materials (AGexp), 
•  fuel exports (FLexp),  
•  exports of ores and metals (ORexp), and  
•  manufacturing exports (MNexp). 
 
Economic prosperity and political freedom (democracy) in a country have been 
widely used as control variables in studies of causes of corruption. The general consensus 
is that the level of corrupt activity declines as nations become more prosperous (GDPpc) 
and democracy grows (DEM).
3  The underlying rationale here is that the desire to circum-
vent legal channels via corrupt means decreases with greater prosperity and the rising op-
portunity cost of being caught. Further, greater press freedom and civil liberties (the two 
main components of political freedom) in a democracy act as checks against corruption if 
they cause government officials to fear exposure of their corrupt dealings (see Bulte and 
Damania, 2008). More economic freedom (EF) entails less government intervention in the 
economy (e.g. banking and trade restrictions, regulatory bottlenecks, or corporate tax 
rates), thereby reducing the opportunities for government officials to solicit bribes (fewer 
“tollbooths” in the parlance of Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Our measures of economic and 
political freedom are widely used in the relevant literature (see Table 1 for details). Open 
economies usually have fewer controls, so we employ the degree of openness of an econ-
omy as another measure of the level of economic freedom. We postulate that openness of 
the economy (OPEN, sum of exports and imports as share of GDP) could affect corruption 
as a determinant of susceptibility to corruption. Indeed, in their examination of the relative 
effects of economic and political freedoms on corruption across countries, Goel and Nel-
son (2005) find that greater economic freedom is more effective at reducing corruption 
than greater political freedom. 
 
3 Our use of GDP data for 2005, while employing the CPI for 2007, helps make the prosperity variable 
somewhat predetermined. Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





                                                
The government plays a crucial role in corruption as it has monopoly control over 
the provision of many services. This control presents rent-seeking opportunities to bureau-
crats in charge of disbursing government goods and services. The size of the government 
(GCONS) captures the magnitude of government machinery. Greater size could imply 
higher spending on monitoring and policing, but it could also imply more red tape (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). In our sample, government size in 2005 ranged from 4.1% of GDP in 
Cambodia to 44.6% of GDP in Eritrea. Cross-country studies generally find that the level 
of corrupt activity goes down with a larger government size (Goel and Nelson, 2005). 
Ethnic, linguistic and religious differences within and across nations might dictate 
the prevalence of corrupt practices (Paldam, 2002). For example, Japan is ethnically and 
linguistically more homogeneous than, say, the United States. We thus argue it may be eas-
ier to formulate corrupt relations in certain contexts (Lambsdorff and Teksoz, 2004) and 
harder in others where religious or ethnic beliefs see certain acts as corrupt. Fractionaliza-
tion of a society can give rise to clan-based behavior, where members of an ethnic, linguis-
tic or religious group favor each other over outsiders. This kind of behavior can increase 
corruption. To capture these differences consistently across nations, we employ three indi-
ces of fractionalization:  
•  ETHNIC is an index of ethnic fractionalization, 
•  LANG is an index of linguistic fractionalization, and  
•  RELG is an index of religious fractionalization in a country.
4  
 
These data and the corresponding details are available from Alesina et al. (2003). 
  Turning to the role of exports, we disaggregate a country’s exports into four 
categories:  
 
•  exports of agricultural raw materials (AGexp),  
•  fuel exports (FLexp),  
•  exports of ores and metals (ORexp), and 
•  manufacturing exports (MNexp).  
 
4  Many studies use composite indices that capture the ethnolinguistic fractionalization in countries. Our use 
of separate fractionalization indices is more revealing and we find different effects across fractionalization 
types (see below). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
As shown in Figure 1 above, there are wide variations in the share of these exports 
across nations. Further these materials are qualitatively different, which might affect the 
rent-generating opportunities associated with them. For instance, the perishable nature of 
agricultural exports would add a sense of urgency to these transactions, while manufactur-
ing or metals exports do not face similar limitations. Further, the non-renewability of cer-
tain fuels would add another qualitative dimension of associated transactions, corrupt or 
otherwise. Whereas there is some research that examines the nexus between exports and 
corruption, examination of exports at a disaggregated level is rather rare.
5 Recog-
nizing that the data might be unable to capture certain subtle differences across groups of 
countries, we use two dichotomous control variables. TRAN is a dummy variable identify-
ing transition countries to see whether there are some unique characteristics in these na-
tions that spur corruption (Kronenberg, 2004). There might be disproportionate rent-
seeking opportunities in initial years due to large-scale privatization or underdeveloped 
checks and balances. Institutions might also be underdeveloped in the least-developed na-
tions (Bardhan, 1997). However, rent-seeking opportunities (i.e. size of the discretionary 
pie) might be small in these countries. On the other hand, least-developed nations might be 
more eager to control corruption in order to qualify for foreign assistance. To see whether 
these influences matter, we include DEV as a dummy variable that identifies least-
developed nations as classified by the United Nations. 
The data include cross-sectional country level observations for about 130 nations 
for 2007 (or the closest year available). Details about the variables used, definitions and 
data sources are provided in Table 1. Next, we will briefly examine the underlying data. 
Table 2 gives the basic statistical indicators for different variables. Figure 2 shows that 
there is a negative correlation between per capita GDP and the level of corruption. This 
correlation has been documented in the literature before. However, our research will add to 
this dicussion by examining whether the correlation holds when a number of pertinent 
variables, especially exports under various categories, are taken into account. 
 
 
5  In the study of Petermann et al. (2007), the authors examine the effect of ore and fuel exports on corruption 
across countries with different income levels (see also Douoguih, 2005); Leite and Weidmann, 1999; and 
Bulte and Damania, 2008). Our study differs substantially from Petermann et al. in that we:  
•  use a greater degree of export disaggregation,  
•  employ more control variables,  
•  use a sample of countries nearly twice as large, and  Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





Figure 2  Per capita GDP and corruption 
 
 
4  Estimation 
 
Following the above discussion, we arrive at the following general estimation model. The 
level of corrupt activity in a nation is determined by the factors outlined in equation (1) 
below, including economic, social, political, and governmental. 
Corruptioni = f (Economic prosperityi, Political freedomi, Economic freedomi, Government 
sizei, Fractionalizationij, Exportsik)     (1) 
    i = 1,…, 132 
    j = ETHNIC, LANG, RELG 
    k = AGexp, FLexp, ORexp, MNexp 
A number of specific variables are used in this study to capture the right-hand-side control 
variables mentioned in (1). They are discussed in detail below, with additional technical 
details provided in Table 1. 
As was explained above, our dependent variable is a transformation of the corrup-
tion perceptions index (CPI) from the Transparency International, ln[(10-CPI)/CPI]. There-
fore, in our estimation and the subsequent discussion, an increase in the corruption index 
                                                                                                                                                    
•  base our work on newer data. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




means increase in corruption. We control for political and economic freedom, as well as 
per capita GDP, government size and different measures of fractionalization. 
The main focus of our study is the effect different exports have on corruption. To 
reiterate, we use our four export categories: exports of agricultural raw materials (AGexp), 
fuel exports (FLexp), exports of ores and metals (ORexp) and manufacturing exports 
(MNexp). As shown in Figure 1 above, there are wide variations across nations in the share 
of these exports. Further these materials are qualitatively different, which might affect the 
rent-seeking opportunities associated with them. Whereas there is some research that ex-
amines the nexus between exports and corruption (see Jain, 2001; and Lambsdorff, 2006), 
examination of exports at a disaggregated level is rare.  
The estimation is conducted using the STATA software package. In keeping with 
the requirements of the study and the nature of the data, three different estimation method-
ologies were employed: 
•  ordinary least squares or OLS (Tables 2 and 3), and  
•  two-stage least squares (2SLS) (Table A1). 
 
 
5  Results 
 
Tables 2-3 and A1 present different variations of equation (1) using appropriate estimation 
techniques. The overall fit of the all the models estimated is quite good. We discuss the 
findings of each table below.6 
 
Baseline models 
The baseline models include a number of factors affecting corruption that have 
been used elsewhere. However, our sample size is larger and the data are more recent. We 
do not include resource disaggregation in these models as our primary objectives here are 
to provide a benchmark and facilitate comparison with the extant literature. 
The results show that greater economic prosperity reduces corruption, a finding 
consistent with the extant literature (Serra, 2006). Both greater economic and greater po-Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





                                                                                                                                                   
litical freedom reduce corruption, albeit the coefficient on DEM is statistically insignificant 
in one case. The findings with respect to economic freedom are robust whether economic 
freedom is measured via an index (EF) or through the degree of openness (OPEN). The 
relative effectiveness of economic freedom over political freedom in controlling corruption 
has been shown in earlier studies (Goel and Nelson, 2005). Ceteris paribus, larger govern-
ment size seems to curb corruption. Apparently, larger government is associated more with 
checks and balances to reduce corruption and less with increased red tape. The coefficient 
on GCONS is negative and statistically significant in models 2A-2C estimated in Table 2.
7 
To capture whether more affluent nations have more effective large governments, model 
2D adds an interaction term between per capita GDP and government size. In this case, the 
coefficient on GDPpc loses statistical significance. Interestingly, now the coefficient on 
GCONS changes sign (and is statistically significant), while that on the interaction term 
(GCONS*lnGDPpc) is negative. This implies that, while a larger government might con-
tribute to corruption by adding more bureaucracy, more affluent nations benefit from the 
corruption-reducing aspects of government size. 
Again, ceteris paribus, corruption in transition countries (TRAN) is higher sug-
gesting the influence of disproportionate rent-seeking opportunities and perhaps underde-
veloped systems of checks and balances. Interestingly, the coefficient on DEV that identi-
fies the least-developed nations is negative and statistically significant. This implies that, 
with the level of GDP per capita held the same, either the least-developed nations were 
heeding international pressures in curbing corruption or there was greater mis-
measurement in the corruption indices in these cases.
8 
Turning to the indices capturing the degrees of fractionalization, greater ethnic 
fractionalization seems to increase corruption, while more linguistic and religious fraction-
alizations have negative signs, with the sign on religious fractionalization statistically in-
significant. Greater ethnic fractionalization can lead to more corruption in cases where 
there is lack of general trust across different ethnicities and money is used to grease rela-
 
6 Since the dependent variable (and some control variables) is measured via an index, appropriate caution 
should be exercised in the interpretation of the findings. 
7  It is worth pointing out that the size of the governments masks other, possibly relevant, governmental 
attributes such as the structure and form of the government. Incorporation of government quality measures is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
8  It should also be borne in mind that the overall size of the rents that can be potentially sought is relatively 
small in developing nations. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
tions and build trust. On the other hand, linguistic differences may curb corruption where 
the inability to communicate acts as a barrier to the formation of corrupt contracts. 
 
Export composition and corruption 
 
Table 3 reports OLS results when exports are disaggregated across our four cate-
gories (AGexp, FLexp, ORexp, and MNexp) to reveal differential influences in these cate-
gories on corruption. The findings with respect to GDPpc, DEM, GCONS and TRAN mir-
ror those from Table 2. Specifically, greater economic prosperity, greater economic and 
political freedoms, and larger government size all reduce corruption. In terms of the mag-
nitude of impact, a one percent increase in per capita GDP leads to a roughly half percent 
reduction in corruption. Again, corruption was higher in transition countries. 
Turning to the effects of various exports, agricultural exports seem to reduce cor-
ruption, while higher fuel exports increase corruption. The effects of ore and manufactur-
ing exports are statistically insignificant.9  In terms of magnitude, the absolute value of the 
coefficient on AGexp is nearly twice that on FLexp. It might be the case that the nature of 
these commodities affects the relative discount rates of bribe-payers and bribe-givers with 
different impacts on the level of corrupt activities. For instance, we can infer that perish-
able agricultural goods would warrant that transactions be executed expeditiously reducing 
the time for formulation of corrupt contracts. Also, agricultural production tends to be 
more dispersed, making it more difficult for corrupt officials to monitor. This positive im-
pact of agricultural exports can be seen as supporting the notion that some resources can be 
a “blessing” (Stevens, 2003). On the other hand, the scarcity and relative longevity of fuels 
might turn out to be conducive to corruption, and their relatively concentrated extraction 
makes it easier to demand bribes.  
Further, to account for possible nonlinearities between democracy and resources, 
models 3G and 3H include interaction terms between DEM and AGexp and FLexp, respec-
tively. Coefficients on both the interaction variables are statistically insignificant. This im-
plies that the effect of natural resource endowment does not depend on the degree of de-
mocracy.  
 
9 In a study comparing the relative effects of fuel and non-fuel mineral exports, Petermann et al. (2007) note 
mixed effects of mineral exports on corruption. This somewhat contradicts the earlier study of Douoguih 
(2005), which finds the effects of non-fuel mining significant under certain situations. Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





The overall finding that when it comes to corruption, not all type of exports are 
alike and this has important implications for the formulation of effective domestic and in-
ternational corruption control policies. 
 
Robustness check 
  We perform a robustness check on our findings. It involves allowing for en-
dogenous government size. The corresponding results are reported in the Appendix. 
 
Endogeneity of Government Size 
It has been argued that corruption might be endogenous with respect to some of its 
determinants. In other words, some factors that cause corruption might in turn themselves 
be affected by the level of corrupt activity. Arguably the most prominent of these factors is 
the government size (GCONS in Table 1). On the one hand, a large government affects 
corruption by increasing rent-seeking opportunities (as potential bribe-seekers offer money 
to circumvent bottlenecks) and via greater spending on monitoring and enforcement. On 
the other hand, greater corruption may bloat the government machinery through increased 
red tape as “tollbooths” are set up.  
To account for the possible simultaneity between corruption and government size, 
we ran a version of the baseline models presented in Table 2 (Model 2A), by allowing 
government size to be endogenous. The corresponding two-stage least squares (2SLS) re-
sults, using population (POP) and literacy (LIT) as additional instruments, are reported in 
the Table A1. The results are very similar to Model 2A. Specifically, greater economic 
prosperity, more economic freedom and a larger government size all reduce corruption, 
while, other things being the same, corruption is greater in transition nations. The effect of 
political freedom or democracy is statistically insignificant.  
 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
Using recent data from a large sample of countries, this paper studied the connection be-
tween a country’s natural resource endowments and corruption. Earlier empirical studies 
found that prevalence of mineral wealth was often associated with higher corruption levels 
(see Stevens, 2003). Here, we incorporated the role of exports at the disaggregated level BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




over a fairly large set of nations and during a recent time period. Focus on possible agricul-
ture exports-corruption nexus has been especially missing.  Our main thesis was that un-
derstanding of the role of various raw material types on corruption can help in the formula-
tion of effective corruption-control policies. We asked whether various types of raw mate-
rial endowments exert similar influences on corruption across nations. 
Based on several estimates with different estimation methodologies, the following 
conclusions emerge. The baseline models (Table 2) show that corruption decreases: 
•  as nations attain prosperity,  
•  as economic and political freedoms increase, and  
•  with larger government size.  
The findings with respect to economic freedom were robust across two different 
measures. Transition countries were more corrupt, ceteris paribus, while corruption was 
lower in the least-developed nations. Degrees of ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations had 
opposite effects on corruption, while religious fractionalization did not seem to matter. The 
different relative impacts of the various types of fractionalization provide a richer insight 
compared to studies that employ composite fractionalization indices. Overall, the findings 
of the benchmark models generally support those in the literature (see Lambsdorff, 2006), 
albeit with more recent and larger data and in some cases with more detailed control vari-
ables. 
Focusing on the possible differential effects across export types (Table 3), it 
seems that only agricultural and fuel exports significantly affected corruption. The effects 
of ore and manufacturing exports were statistically insignificant. Interestingly, while 
higher fuel exports increased corruption, greater agricultural exports had the opposite ef-
fect. In terms of magnitude, the absolute value of the coefficient on agricultural exports is 
nearly twice that on fuel exports. It might be the case that fuel endowments presented op-
portunities for rent-seeking behavior, while agricultural contracts were relatively more de-
centralized and in such cases the level of corrupt activity actually went down. However, 
the interactions of these resources with democracy failed to produce statistical significance 
(models 3G and 3H).  The effects of the other variables, including economic prosperity, 
democracy, government size and transition nation status, reinforced the findings from Ta-
ble 2. Further, the signs and magnitudes of these variables were quite robust to model 
specifications across the eight variations reported in Table 3. Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 





Turning to the policy implications of our findings, it appears that different re-
source types affect corruption differently. Not all resource types can be seen as a curse, and 
some might well be a blessing. The signs and magnitudes of the resource effects vary in 
terms of their impact on corruption. Thus, it would be imprudent to base policies on a 
blanket notion that natural resource wealth necessarily leads to corruption. Further, the 
findings reinforce some policy recommendations from the literature that as nations achieve 
greater economic prosperity, the level of corrupt activity declines. However, corruption in 
the least-developed nations was lower, pointing perhaps to nonlinearities in the relation 
between wealth and corruption, or the inability of dichotomous variables to capture subtle 
institutional differences. Improvements in economic and political freedoms also seem 
beneficial for corruption control. The extra bureaucracy associated with larger govern-
ments does not seem to contribute to corruption. Rather, a larger government lowers cor-
ruption by strengthening checks and balances, especially in the most affluent nations. Poli-
cies paring government size are not supported with respect to corruption control. It seems 
that transition nations face peculiar issues regarding corruption control and would warrant 
special attention be given to such countries.  
In closing, we offer the caveat that, in the absence of the ability to measure actual 
corruption, we have proxied the level of corruption with an index of perceived corruption. 
Thus, while the CPI has gained wide acceptance and continues to improve over time, it is 
not without limitations (see Treisman, 2007). Further, the role of institutions is quite im-
portant in the context of their bearing on corruption (Knack and Keefer, 1995). However, 
not all these institutions are equally amenable to quantitative measurement.  Finally, there 
is the fine, yet important, distinction between petty and grand corruption. Some countries 
have mainly grand corruption (e.g. the United States), while others have both grand and 
petty corruption (e.g. India and Nigeria). Differences in corruption types can crucially af-
fect perceptions about corruption (and the resulting indices).  This aspect deserves addi-
tional attention in the literature.BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 












(Mean; Std. Dev.) 
 
Source 
CPI  Corruption Perceptions Index,  Transparency International  (10 highly clean,  
0 highly corrupt), 2007 (3.98; 2.09) 
I 
GDPpc  GDP per capita (PPP 2000 international $), 2005, (9649.41; 10498.98)  II 
EF  Economic Freedom in a country, (% free), 2007 
(60.56; 10.59) 
III 
DEM  Sum of a country’s political rights and civil liberties scores,  
(higher score, more democratic), 2007 
(-6.71; 3.83) 
IV 
GCONS  General government final consumption expenditure  
(% of GDP), 2005 
(15.80; 6.76) 
II 
AGexp  Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 
(4.44; 9.56) 
II 
FLexp  Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 
(16.51; 25.92) 
II 
ORexp  Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 
(5.79; 10.30) 
II 
MNexp  Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports), 2004 
(50.89; 30.72) 
II 
OPEN  Exports plus imports (% of GDP), 2004 
(94.55; 54.02) 
II 
ETHNIC  Ethnic fractionalization 
(0.44; 0.26) 
V 
LANG  Language fractionalization  
(0.40; 0.28) 
V 
RELG  Religious fractionalization 
(0.43; 0.23)  
V 
POP  Population, 2005 
(3.59E+07; 1.32E+08) 
II 
LIT  Literacy rate (% of literate population above age 15), 2006 
(79.10; 20.75) 
II 
TRAN  Dummy variable = 1 if a country is a transition economy, 0 otherwise 
(0.15; 0.36) 
VI 
DEV  Dummy variable = 1 if a country is considered least developed, 0 otherwise 
(0.26; 0.44) 
VI 
WB  Corruption Perceptions Index,  World Bank 




Note: All data are by country 
Data sources 
 
I.  http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 
II.  World Development Indicators CDROM, 2007 
III.  http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm 
IV.  http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf 
V.  Alesina et al. (2003) 
VI.  http://www.unpan1.un.org  
VII.  http://www.govindicators.orgRajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 








Cross-country causes of corruption: Baseline models 
 
(Dependent variable: ln ((10-CPI)/CPI) 
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EF  -0.05** 
(6.8) 
  -0.05** 
(6.1) 




































OPEN     -0.003** 
(2.0) 
 
GCONS*ln GDPpc       -0.02** 
(2.5) 
        
N  129 132  132  129 
 
F-value  57.1** 34.0**  31.4**  63.9** 
 
R
2  0.80 0.73  0.75  0.82 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors. ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * denotes sig-
nificance at the 10% level. All models included a constant term, but those results are not reported here to 
conserve space. 
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Export Composition and Corruption 
 
(Dependent Variable: ln ((10-CPI)/CPI) 
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AGexp  -0.009** 
(2.4) 





FLexp   0.005* 
(1.9) 




ORexp     -0.004 
(1.2) 
      







DEM*AGexp         0.0002 
(0.1) 
 
DEM*FLexp           0.00001 
(0.02) 
            
N  105  105 105 105 105 105 105  105 
 
F-value  40.4** 37.2**  38.8**  39.0**  33.3** 31.2** 35.2**  30.8** 
 
R
2  0.70  0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70  0.70 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors. ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * denotes sig-
nificance at the 10% level. All models included a constant term, but those results are not reported here to 
conserve space. 
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Causes of corruption: Allowing for endogenous GCONS 
 
(Dependent variable: ln ((10-CPI)/CPI) 
 
ln GDPpc  -0.18** 
(4.6) 
DEM  -0.01 
(0.5) 
EF  -0.05** 
(3.8) 
GCONS  -0.02** 
(3.2) 
TRAN  0.27** 
(3.3) 
  
N  89 
 
F-value  65.1** 
 
R
2  0.75 
 
 
Notes: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The reported results are the second stage estimates of a 
2SLS regression, with POP and LIT as additional instruments for GCONS. The numbers in parentheses are 
absolute values of t-statistics. ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * denotes signi-
ficance at the 10% level. The model included a constant term, but those results are not reported here to 
conserve space. 
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